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The theses and program below ask about judgment and tradition in a self-consciously 
plural world.  The little program points down a path I am exploring in a pair of texts, 
one on notions of identity in the history of philosophy, and one on the identity of 
buildings and places.  The underlying issue of those texts is: what will replace the old 
notion of a particular identity?
Places, persons, and communities do not and have never had such simple identities as 
our concepts often made them out to have.  But our world today defies the application 
of universal categories and judgments to fixed particulars.  Our places and identities 
become complexly multiplied, they interpenetrate, the electronic no-place / all-place 
opens before us.  Yet at the same time exclusions and particularities assert themselves 
everywhere.
If universal judgment seems unlikely, relativism is one response, but relativism remains 
within the horizon of universals and particulars.  What kinds of identity can provide 
standpoints for describing and judging today?
Five Theses
I.  Architecture has a distinctive exposure to community judgment.
Architectural works obtrude into the physical context to a degree and with a 
permanence that other arts seldom accomplish.  They are exposed to daily use, involved 
in different activities and interactions.  They shape our lives, so judgment about them 
seems important.  In planning and constructing architectural works many people 
cooperate.  During this process intentions are explained; functions are evaluated; 
choices are made.  Compared to the other arts, there is then more evidence about the 
intentions and program behind the work and the choices made in its design.  So 
judgment on these intentions and choices seems possible.  Such community judgment 
can range from public debate about the appropriateness of a new town hall, to learned 
professional critical discussion of the merits and demerits of a new project, to two 
people saying after a party that they would never live in That house.
II.  Architecture has a distinctive resistance to judgment.
Although statements of intention and program exist, they are texts that need 
interpretation.  Perhaps there were unwritten agreements, perhaps there were private 
intentions, perhaps the parties understood the terms differently, perhaps the language 
has changed.  No text is self-interpreting.
Although architectural works intrude into the public context, a context is not a 
predetermined and fully definite thing; it too needs interpretation, and the building 
may interpret the context as much as the context the building.
Although buildings have more flanks exposed to criticism, they tend to outlive 
their critics and the climate of opinion that judges them.  Functions and modes of life 
change.  Judgments that seemed firm lose their hold as time goes on.  Grand old 
buildings become an embarrassment because no suitable use can be found for them.  
"That house" becomes something to be preserved for its unique quirks.  The 
"inappropriate" town hall becomes a symbol of our city.  The work that violated the 
rules of a style becomes emblematic of a new style.
III.  Disagreement over standards cannot be legislated away.
Judges usually evaluate program and design choices on the basis of many sorts 
of criteria: function, appearance, immediate reactions, community standards, previous 
experiences, notions of function, rules of design, philosophies of art, and so on.  It is not 
automatically clear what aspects of the context are relevant and what previous works 
should be taken as precedents.  There are many possible relations of similarity.  Who 
will judge the judges?  In today's communities the "we" that judges is not so unified.
When there is disagreement about the standards of judgment, it is tempting but 
futile to insist that a building be judged only in this or that context or according to this 
one set of rules, because the differences may run too deep.  For example, between 
Gothic and Classical in the nineteenth century there was no agreement on questions of 
style, but also about what should be the appropriate architectural precedents, which 
were the important similarities to be followed and functions to be filled, and ultimately 
about what the community was trying to be for itself.
Attempting to avoid the nineteenth century's seemingly arbitrary choices of 
symbolism and rules, many modernists tried to determine universal standards based on 
a small number of overriding functions.  But either this forcefully reduced the scope of 
life or the restrictions were swamped by the vitality of social life.  That same vitality 
makes us realize that agreement over standards is not necessarily a good thing; there 
are levels and creativity and conflict within any community.  Uniform judgments may 
express domination rather than consensus.
IV.  Judgment is not detached and arbitrary.
Another temptation is to see the judge as detached from any of the possible sub-
communities and criteria.  Such a judge would first perform (or accept) some arbitrary 
act of interpretation that established relations of similarity and precedent, thus defining 
the object and criteria of judgment.  The myth of such a detached judge is the same as 
the myth of the architect as sovereign form-giver.
Arbitrary choice does not create inhabitation.  We do not so freely locate 
ourselves; we find ourselves already within languages, forms of life, multiple ongoing 
projects and precedents.  Their multiplicity and our mode of being in them keeps us 
from any simple detachment.
V.  Judgment is not pre-defined.
The multiplicity of our places and forms of life, and of our mode of being in 
them, also keeps us from simply enacting any pre-programmed judgment.  Our being 
where we are does not mean that we are already in a position to deploy completely 
definite norms, precedents, and criteria.  The judging self, the community, the building, 
its norms, and the contexts are all involved together, but not as pre-defined items.  
Neither we nor the buildings are fully definite standing around available for judgment.  
Not all activity is on the side of the judging subject.  Buildings act too; they can judge 
themselves and they can change us, and this beyond the intentions and choices of their 
design.  The work is always in progress.
A Program
Many difficulties arise in thinking about architectural judgment and inhabitation 
because we rely on the categories of universal and particular.  Our universal activity 
defines the particular.  Or, our particular desires are universalized into standards.  Or, 
judgment is a matter of finding the right universal concepts, or the right particular 
application of a given universal concept.  If the judge's criteria are local to another 
particular group, what is their authority here?  If they are universal and substantive, is 
there a universal community they speak for?  If they are universal and formal, how do 
they get their content?  Judgment seems to be torn between universal rules that have an 
obscure relation to local content, and a particularity that can lead to an enfeebling 
relativism.  We see both of these today, as well as mixtures of the two as in standardized 
historical postmodernism.
In architectural criticism and philosophy debate tends to oscillate between these 
extremes and there are various philosophical and critical strategies for trying to blunt 
the alternatives.  In politics we are familiar with attempts today to assert universal 
standards, and with sometimes violent attempts to assert purified local particularisms.  
What those opposed trends have in common is a defense of the opposition between 
universal and particular against a more multiple identity for places.
The identity of places is not well described by the traditional opposition between 
universal and particular.  The way places become definite is not by assembling 
particular pre-defined details nor by particularizing a pre-given universal essence.  If 
inhabitation is more than particularizing a universal identity, then the judgment 
whether something is appropriate involves another kind of discernment than applying 
a universal rule.  If the identity of places and people is not well described as a collection 
of particulars, then judgment is more than the collision of particular desires with or over 
particular objects.
Discussing the problem of finding criteria for judging forms of life and 
consciousness, Hegel said "consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from 
something, and at the same time relates itself [in its own being] to 
it" («MDUL»Phenomenology of Spirit«MDNM», Introduction, paragraph 82).  There is 
no one-way judging distance.  Building, place, judge, and community are linked; for 
Hegel the ensemble evaluates itself when it tries to become actual and definite.  When 
the culture, or the building, or the judge tries to "posit itself" as definite and affirmative 
it discovers built-in tensions and transgressions within its criteria and its presumed 
wholeness.  It judges itself by its transitions towards something different and more 
inclusive.  For Hegel there is a necessity to this process, based on the development of 
structures of reason, and this leads through many stages to a self-conscious community 
whose inhabitation encompasses division and negation without being torn apart.
This Hegelian dream seems a quixotic and metaphysical goal today.  On the one 
hand, we find around us what Hegel would see as relapses into too easy affirmation of 
simple universal norms, or of given particularities.  On the other hand, we declare our 
age post-modern.  Some of that post-modernism is yet another easy historicism.  But a 
mutated audacious variant of Hegel's gesture appears in deconstructive claims about 
the necessary transgression involved in any posited unity or the necessary 
homelessness within any dwelling.  Self-deconstruction and Hegelian self-consolidation 
both refuse to isolate the judge, or the building.  Both seek kinds of necessity that are 
not the application of universal rules to particular cases.  For both, the building judges 
itself when it tries to do what it seems to be, and this judgment does not reduce to a 
detached subject measuring the fulfillment of a function.  For both, there is no simple 
given identity to places and selves--or to buildings.
Could we rethink the particularity of places as neither simply given nor simply 
constructed (or judged) by an active subjectivity?  Could we follow the suggestion that 
self and place become definite, in varying rhythms, together, yet without falling into 
Hegel's sometimes extreme holism or into deconstruction's sometime extreme 
resentment of unity?
Like many people, I remember as a child trying to write my full address in 
concentric circles: David Kolb, 36 Kenwood Road, Garden City, Nassau County, Long 
Island, New York, U.S.A., North America, Western Hemisphere, Earth, Solar System, 
Milky Way Galaxy, The Local Group, The Universe.  That neat concentric hierarchy 
made me feel both very important and very insignificant.  That hierarchy included 
many systems of objects, but few places as I would define them now.  Now I would 
have a hard time writing my full address, for I live in many places at once that are not 
concentric nor stacked into neat levels.  They intersect at angles and lie together at 
foldings and are open and closed to one another in complex ways without exclusive 
borders.  My inhabitation is multiple, and that multiplicity is not just an additive series 
of smaller seamless inhabitations.  Even the single places are fractured; they are not 
definite particulars resting easily under universals.  Which is not to say that the places 
are indefinite, only that it is difficult to find ways to think their identity and 
interrelation.  This complicates judgment but does not make it disappear.  For within 
those multiple places, perhaps as a condition of their standing together, there are some 
norms that go beyond particular local preferences yet are not of some universal place.
  What would judgment enact in a space that is not structured according to 
universal and particular?  It would not repeat a movement of sovereign constitution.  
Passing judgment would not be the authoritative act of the official critic (or of rivals for 
that status).  The judge would not stand passing sentence based on the final universal or 
the dominating particular.  Perhaps there would be judgment on architectural works in 
the way we might assay a craft object for its workability and for the way it speaks to us 
while also forming us.  That judgment would not be univocal, for our identity is not 
simple.  There would also be judgment in the way a place or a building articulates the 
complexity of its identity and of our inhabitation.
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